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Empathy ≠ sharing: 
Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychology 
 
Dan Zahavi & Philippe Rochat 
 
Abstract 
 
We argue that important insights regarding the topic of sharing can be gathered from 
phenomenology and developmental psychology; insights that in part challenge widespread ideas 
about what sharing is and where it can be found. To be more specific, we first exemplify how the 
notion of sharing is being employed in recent discussions of empathy, and then argue that this 
use of the notion tends to be seriously confused. It typically conflates similarity and sharing and, 
more generally speaking, fails to recognize that sharing proper involves reciprocity. As part of 
this critical analysis, we draw on sophisticated analyses of the distinction between empathy and 
emotional sharing that can be found in early phenomenology. Next, we turn to developmental 
psychology. Sharing is not simply one thing, but a complex and many-layered phenomenon. By 
tracing its early developmental trajectory from infancy and beyond, we show how careful 
psychological observations can help us develop a more sophisticated understanding of sharing 
than the one currently employed in many discussions in the realm of neuroscience. In our 
conclusion, we return to the issue of empathy and argue that although empathy does not involve 
or entail sharing, empathy understood as a basic sensitivity to and understanding of others (rather 
than as a special prosocial concern for others) might be a precondition for sharing. 
 
1. Empathy and affective sharing  
Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of interest in and work on empathy in many different disciplines, 
including philosophy, cognitive science, developmental psychology, social neuroscience, anthropology, 
nursing, and primatology. Despite all the work being done, there is, however, still no firm agreement 
about what precisely empathy is or how it might relate to and differ from motor mimicry, emotional 
contagion, imaginative projection, perspective taking, and sympathy. However, one of the very few ideas 
that have been able to gather widespread agreement is the idea that empathy is a process whereby one 
individual comes to share another individual’s affective experience. Even people who otherwise strongly 
disagree endorse such a view. Here are a few examples:  
In a 2009 paper, Pfeifer and Dapretto write that “shared affect between self and other” constitutes 
the experiential core of empathy (2009, 184). In an article from the same year, Nickerson, Butler and 
Carlin note that the word empathy conveys the notion of “shared or vicarious feeling” (2009, 43). In 
various articles, Decety and colleagues have argued that one of the crucial components of empathy is 
affective sharing between self and other (Decety and Lamm 2006, 1146, Decety and Jackson 2004). And 
whereas Darwall defines empathy as involving something like a sharing of the other’s mental states 
(1998, 263), in her defense of the perception-action model of empathy, Preston refers to empathy as “a 
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shared emotional experience occurring when one person (the subject) comes to feel a similar emotion to 
another (the object) as a result of perceiving the other’s state” (2007, 428).  
Whereas the majority of contemporary empathy theorists endorse the claim that empathy involves 
a sharing of affect across individuals, the main point of controversy concerns the question of whether or 
not such sharing is sufficient for empathy. Some have claimed that it is and have consequently argued 
that various forms of contagion and mimicry count as prime (or at least primitive) examples of empathy 
(cf. Darwall 1998, 264-266, Hatfield et al 2009). Others, by contrast, have insisted on the need for a 
distinction between empathy and emotional contagion and have argued that sharing, while necessary, is 
insufficient, and that it must be accompanied by some self-other differentiation, and by some cognitive 
ascription of the affective state to the other (Jacob 2011). The problem that both sides have in common, 
however, is nicely highlighted in the quote by Preston. On a currently quite popular simulationist 
approach to empathy, empathy requires isomorphic emotional or sensory states in empathizer and target 
and involves some kind of inner imitation. But does similarity amount to sharing? Is it really the same to 
share an emotion with someone and to come to have a similar emotion as someone else as a result of 
perceiving (and imitating) the other’s mental state? We will in section 4 argue that the answer to these 
questions must be negative. But to motivate this argument, let us first quickly consider some of the early 
and very different analyses of empathy and affective sharing that can be found in phenomenology (for 
further details, see Zahavi 2008, 2011, 2012, 2014b, 2015).  
 
2. Empathy 
 
The German term “Einfühlung” was coined in 1873 and used in the domain of aesthetics by the 
philosopher Robert Vischer. It was subsequently taken over by Theodor Lipps, who introduced it into 
the field of social cognition and used it to designate our basic capacity for understanding others. It was 
Lipps’ notion that Edward Titchener, the American psychologist, had in mind when he in 1909 translated 
“Einfühlung” as “empathy”. According to Lipps’ original proposal, we have to distinguish three domains 
of knowledge: 1) knowledge of external objects, 2) self-knowledge, and 3) knowledge of others, and 
Lipps took these domains to have three distinct cognitive sources, namely perception, introspection, and 
empathy (Lipps 1909, 222). In the wake of Lipps’ investigation, a number of phenomenologists engaged 
in intensive discussions regarding the nature and structure of empathy. Whereas they accepted the idea 
that empathy must be equated with (a basic form of) other-understanding, they were more critical of 
Lipps’ suggestion that empathy involves a form of inner imitation, and rejected various attempts to 
explain empathy in terms of mirroring, mimicry, or imitation. As they pointed out, whereas the latter 
processes might explain how and why I come to have a certain experience myself, they do not explain 
how I come to understand the other. For someone to have a feeling herself and for someone to 
empathically understand that another has a feeling are two quite different things (Gurwitsch 1979, 24-
25). Ultimately, the phenomenologists didn’t merely dismiss the proposal that imitation is sufficient for 
empathic understanding. They also questioned whether it is necessary. Can’t I empathically grasp that 
my child is afraid of the dark, without myself being afraid of the dark?  
On a more positive note, the phenomenologists took empathy as the term of choice for our 
perceptually based experience of foreign consciousness, arguing that more complex and indirect forms 
of social cognition presuppose as well as rely upon it (Zahavi 2011, 2014a). Empathy is the experience 
of the embodied mind of the other, an experience which rather than eliminating the difference between 
self-experience and other-experience takes the asymmetry to be a necessary and persisting existential 
fact. Thus, the phenomenologists would strongly have opposed recent claims to the effect that empathic 
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arousal blurs the distinction between self and other, that the other comes to feel like a part of our self, 
and that it leads to a sense of merged personal identities (Cialdini et al 1997). Whereas the experience of 
empathizing is first-personally given, the empathized experience is not given first-personally to the 
empathizer. To insist that the empathizer must have the same (kind of) state as the target, is to miss what 
is distinctive about empathy, namely the fact that it is a special form of other-directed intentionality, one 
that allows the other’s experiences to disclose themselves as other rather than as own (Husserl 1959: 
176). In short, empathy is what allows me to experience other experiencing subjects. It entails neither 
that the other’s experience is literally transmitted to me, nor does it entail that I undergo the experience 
I observe in the other. Rather, to empathically experience, say, the emotion of another necessarily differs 
from the way you would experience the emotion if it were your own. In empathy, you are confronted 
with the presence of an experience that you are not living through yourself. One might say that empathy 
provides a special kind of knowledge by acquaintance. It is not first-person acquaintance, but rather a 
distinct other-acquaintance. Empathy denotes a special kind of epistemic access and shouldn’t be 
confounded with sympathy or compassion. It doesn’t have to be prosocial. As Scheler pointed out, 
empathic sensitivity is a precondition for cruelty, since cruelty requires an awareness of the pain and 
suffering of the other, and must be sharply distinguished from a pathological insensitivity to the pain of 
others (1954: 14). 
None of the phenomenologists would accept the claim that one can only empathize with affective 
states. Rather, they would take empathy to refer to our general ability to access the life of the mind of 
others in their expressions, expressive behavior and meaningful actions. We can see the other’s elation 
or doubt, surprise or attentiveness in his or her face, we can hear the other’s trepidation, impatience or 
bewilderment in her voice, feel the other’s enthusiasm in his handshake, grasp his mood in his posture, 
and see her determination and persistence in her actions. Thus, we certainly also express or manifest our 
mental states by acting on them. My fear or concern is not merely revealed to others in my facial 
expressions, but also in my running away from what terrifies me or in my attempts to console somebody 
who is grieving. Importantly, however, when saying that empathy can provide a special kind of 
understanding, this is not meant to suggest that empathy provides an especially profound or deep kind of 
understanding. In order to obtain that, theoretical inferences and imaginative simulations might very well 
be needed. No, the specificity of the access is due to the fact that it is basic and intuitive, i.e., the 
empathized experience is given directly as existing here and now. Just as we ought to consider the 
difference between thinking about a lion, imagining a lion, and seeing a lion, we also ought to 
acknowledge the difference between referring to Anton’s compassion or sadness, imagining in detail 
what it must be like for him to be compassionate or sad, and being empathically acquainted with his 
compassion or sadness in the direct face-to-face encounter. In the latter case, our acquaintance with 
Anton’s experiential life has a directness and immediacy to it that is not possessed by whatever beliefs I 
might have about him in his absence. 
 
3. We-experience  
 
Early phenomenologists did not simply target empathy in their analyses, however. In her doctoral 
dissertation On the Problem of Empathy, for instance, Stein also considers the following case of shared 
joy (her dissertation was written during World War I): A special edition of the newspaper reports that a 
fortress has fallen. When learning of this, we are all seized by ‘the same’ excitement and joy. Does this 
entail that the borders between the participating individuals have broken down? Stein denies this. On her 
account, I feel my joy and I empathically comprehend the others’ joy and see it as the same. As a result, 
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our respective joys overlap and coincide. I come to feel their joy as mine and vice versa. The we 
consequently arises from the ‘I’ and the ‘you’. What we feel, when we share a joy is different from what 
I feel and what you feel in isolation. But the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ is retained in the we (Stein 1989, 17-18).  
A number of interesting ideas are introduced here. Most relevant for our present purposes, 
however, is the idea that shared emotions rather than simply being a question of having the same kind of 
emotion as another, involve a reference to the first-person plural. They amount to a dynamically emergent 
and negotiated we-experience. There is an interplay of both identification and differentiation. 
Stein’s brief description is amplified and further developed a few years later in Gerda Walther’s 
1919 dissertation Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften. In her analysis, Walther carefully 
distinguishes experiential sharing from empathy, sympathy and imitation (and emotional contagion). On 
her account, to grasp the experiences of the other empathically is quite different from sharing his 
experiences. In empathy, I grasp the other’s experiences insofar as they are expressed in words, gestures, 
body posture, facial expressions etc. Throughout I am aware that it is not me who is living through these 
experiences, but that they belong to the other, that they are the other’s experiences, and that they are only 
given to me qua expressive phenomena (Walther 1923, 73). Even if we by coincidence had had the same 
kind of experiences, this would not amount to a shared experience, to an experience we were undergoing 
together. Despite the similarity of the two experiences, they would not be unified in the requisite manner, 
but would simply stand side by side as belonging to distinct individuals (Walther 1923, 74). To feel 
sympathy for somebody, to be happy because he is happy or sad because he is sad also differs from being 
happy or sad together with the other (Walther 1923, 76-77). Finally, we also need to distinguish 
experiential and emotional sharing from imitation or contagion. In the latter case, I might take over the 
experience of somebody else and come to experience it as my own. But insofar as that happens, and 
insofar as I then no longer have any awareness of the other’s involvement, it has nothing to do with 
shared experiences. The latter requires a preservation of plurality. In the case of, say, shared joy, the joy 
is precisely no longer simply experienced by me as yours and/or mine, but as ours. Walther consequently 
claims that we-experiences involve a peculiar belonging-to-me of the other’s experience (1923, 75). Or 
as Jessica and Peter Hobson would put it almost hundred years later, emotional sharing must encompass 
“the other as participating, with me, in that experience” (Hobson & Hobson 2014, 188). This is why it 
makes perfect sense to articulate the experience in question with the use of the first-person plural: ‘We 
enjoyed the movie’, or ‘We saw the traffic accident’. 
 
4. Sharing revisited 
 
We are still quite far from being in a position to offer a positive account of what sharing amounts to. But 
enough has been said to reach various negative conclusions. If one accepts the phenomenological account 
of empathy, empathy does not involve similar states in empathizer and target. You might empathically 
grasp your colleague’s distress when he receives notice of his demotion even though you are personally 
delighted by this piece of news. The fact that you do not feel the same kind of distress, the fact that you 
are feeling a very different emotion (e.g., Schadenfreude), does not make it any less a case of empathy, 
nor does it make your awareness of his distress merely inferential or imaginative in character. But even 
if one is unwilling to endorse this classical analysis of empathy, reasons have been given to resist 
Preston’s claim that similarity amounts to sharing. Likewise, it is not plausible to claim, as Michael has 
done in a recent article, that emotion detection amounts to a minimal form of sharing and that a 
paradigmatic way of sharing an emotion is for X to express an affective state, and for Y to perceive that 
expression (Michael 2011, 361-363). Just as Y through her observation of X can come to be in the same 
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kind of state as X without sharing that state with X, Y can empathize with X without X being in any way 
aware of it. Empathy can, in short, be one-sided, it doesn’t have to be reciprocal. That is, however, 
arguably a clear requirement for emotional sharing. To claim that I am (aware of) sharing one of your 
emotions, while denying that you are (aware of) sharing one of mine, does not seem to make that much 
sense. Consider, by comparison, recent work on joint attention. There is widespread consensus that joint 
attention is not simply a question of two unrelated people simultaneously looking at the same thing, nor 
is it sufficient that the attention of one of them is causally influenced by the eye direction of the other. 
For joint attention to occur, the attentional focus of two persons (or more) shouldn’t merely run in 
parallel, it must be joint in the sense that it is shared, i.e., it must involve an awareness of attending 
together. The fact that both persons are attending to the same object must, to use Sperber and Wilson‘s 
(1986) phrase, be ‘mutually manifest’. This is precisely what makes joint attention quite unlike any kind 
of experience one might have on one’s own. The emphasis here is clearly on the importance of bi-
directionality and reciprocity.  
Given these considerations, one ought to reject the widespread idea that empathy involves a 
sharing of affects. The very idea is premised on a misunderstanding of what both empathy and sharing 
amount to. But how should we then approach sharing? What does it involve? Given what has been said 
so far, it appears as if the answer requires a closer explorations of we-intentions. Let us briefly consider 
two proposals found in recent discussions of social ontology. 
In his book, The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, Tuomela discusses what a 
shared we-attitude amounts to and offers the following summary of his analysis: 
 
(WI) A member Ai of a collective g we-intends to do X if and only if 
(i) Ai intends to do his part of X (as his part of X); 
(ii) Ai has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance 
of X will obtain (or at least probably will obtain), especially that a right number of the full-
fledged and adequately informed members of g, as required for the performance of X, will (or at 
least probably will) perform their parts of X, which under normal conditions will result in an 
intentional joint performance of X by the participants; 
(iii) Ai believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participating members of g 
(or at least among those participants who perform their parts of X intentionally as their parts of 
X there is or will be a mutual belief) to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an 
intentional performance of X will obtain (or at least probably will obtain); 
(iv) (i) in part because of (ii) and (iii) (Tuomela 2007, 93-94). 
 
On this construal, sharing must be seen as a fairly demanding cognitive accomplishment. 
Consider next a proposal by Hans Bernhard Schmid. He argues that what.is shared, i.e. that which 
belongs to us, precedes the distinction between yours and mine, and is prior to any form of 
intersubjectivity or mutual recognition (Schmid 2005, 145, 149, 296). On his account, emotional sharing 
does not presuppose the givenness of the other experiencer, but rather precedes any such givenness (2005, 
138). More generally speaking, Schmid denies that the we is founded upon an other-experience or in any 
other way involves or presupposes some kind of reciprocal relation between I and you, self and other. 
Likewise, he also questions whether plural self-awareness (and having a sense of us) really presupposes 
singular self-awareness, and instead suggests that one in ontogeny first becomes aware of oneself qua 
member of a group, and that plural self-awareness and group-membership to that extent precedes and 
grounds singular self-awareness (Schmid 2014, 23). 
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Both of these proposals can be subjected to philosophical scrutiny (cf. Salmela 2012, Zahavi 
2014b). At a more empirical level, we can also evaluate the assumptions driving such theories in light of 
developmental psychology. What kind of developmental support is there for either of the proposals? 
Does it support the view that sharing can only occur after the child has acquired the ability to engage in 
sophisticated action planning and metacognition, or will it rather point to the emotional and embodied 
roots of sharing? Will it support a claim concerning the basic and primordial character of the we, or rather 
demonstrate that the we is a developmental achievement? As we shall see, neither of the proposals seem 
to resonate well with what developmental psychology can teach us. Beside serving a critical function, 
looking at developmental psychology provides some empirical ground for a more careful and nuanced 
understanding of what sharing might stand for, including a distinction between different forms of sharing 
and how reciprocal exchanges develop early in life, from infancy and beyond (for further details, see 
Rochat 2014). One important outcome of our analysis is also that empathy although clearly insufficient 
for sharing, might nevertheless play a crucial enabling role.  
 
5. Sharing in development    
Progress in infancy research during the past 40 years has debunked many classical theoretical 
assumptions; assumptions revolving around the ill-informed intuition of a starting state characterized by 
un-differentiation and an initial state of emotional, social, perceptual and cognitive incompetence in 
newborns.  
It is now well established that we are not born in a blooming, buzzing, confusion, in some state 
of undifferentiated fusion with the environment, as proposed by William James over a century ago, 
assumed also by many pioneer child psychologists such as Piaget, Wallon, Baldwin, or Freud and many 
of his followers like Mahler or Klein (Rochat 2011). We now know that newborns perceive their own 
body as a differentiated entity among other entities. For example, they root significantly more toward the 
finger of someone touching their cheek (single touch), than toward their own fingers touching their cheek 
(double touch, Rochat & Hespos 1997). Furthermore, research show that hour-old infants are already 
sensitive to distal objects and not just proximal stimulations hitting the senses (Slater et al. 1990; Kellman 
& Aterberry 2006). Infants from birth show remarkable attunement to particular features in the 
environment. They prefer and discriminate among animate as opposed to inanimate things; face vs. non-
face entities (see Rochat 2001 for a review); familiar as opposed to unfamiliar people based on even pre-
natal experience of maternal voice and the taste of maternal amniotic fluid (Marlier et al. 1998). 
In relation to the issue introduced above and motivating this article, we have to note that the 
concept of empathy has also been used ambiguously in the developmental literature, often with strong 
pro-social connotations. Although we cannot expand on the issue, we do not agree with the definition 
and developmental threshold postulated by, for instance, Doris Bischof-Köhler (1991) and Michael 
Lewis (2001). On our more minimal definition of empathy as a basic sensitivity to the mindedness of 
others, such sensitivity is manifest from the outset. What changes in development is its form and content. 
By 6 weeks, if not earlier, infants are already sensitive to 1) eye gaze, 2) ‘motherese’, and 3) turn-taking 
contingency. As Csibra has argued, this shows that they are able to recognize that they are being 
addressed by someone else’s communicative intentions long before they are able to specify what those 
intentions are (Csibra 2010, 143). The basic empathic ability by which the child clearly distinguishes 
between persons and inanimate things allows them to develop various levels of experiential sharing. This 
development follows the marked and rapid expansion of children’s awareness of being with others in the 
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world. In what follows, we describe 3 major levels unfolding in development between birth and 5 years. 
These levels are in turn primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. Each of these levels emerging in 
development determine ways and forms of sharing that are fundamentally different in both content and 
function. However, as we will also see, although each determines primary bounding and some sort of 
social togetherness or experience of ‘we-ness’, as discussed above, none of them presuppose either 
absolute fusion or strict sameness of experience. Rather, we will show that at each level, and from the 
earliest age, children engage in dynamic co-regulation with others that amounts to an open-ended system 
of negotiation, where this includes the dynamic process of constant affect monitoring and emotional 
alignment with others, i.e., a mutual adjustment between self and others’ experience. Even sharing a good 
laugh entails timing and monitoring of other’s responses to one’s laugh. Such process is a central feature 
of experiential sharing and is expressed from the outset. At each level, the child comes to experience a 
different kind of co-engagement with others, from individual persons at primary and secondary levels of 
intersubjectivity, eventually expanded to the larger group at the tertiary level of intersubjectivity. 
However, throughout this process and at each level, none of the protagonists abandon their own 
perspective or subjectivity. For each level there is a different kind of co-engagement entailing some 
degree of identification. But the perspectives never fuse with one another; they always remain 
differentiated in order to allow for coordination. Inversely, such coordination does not appear to emerge 
from an original state of fusion or symbiosis with the other, as psychoanalysts tend to suggest, but rather 
from an original self-world differentiation combined with the innate ability to discriminate and empathize 
with people as distinct sentient and animated entities in the world. Although it has sometimes been 
claimed that young children fail to appreciate the separateness of subjects of experience, and that their 
awareness of mental states involves an undifferentiated we, not decomposable into I and you, early joint 
attention interactions provide, as Roessler has pointed out, straightforward counter-evidence, since the 
whole point of proto-declaratives is to bring someone else’s focus of attention in line with one’s own 
(Roessler 2005, 247). 
  As we will see next, each of these 3 basic levels adds a new layer of meaning to sharing, 
progressively expanding from the individual to the group. This enlargement follows a path that parallels 
and echoes the development of self-consciousness (cf. Rochat 2009), leading children, from the exchange 
of gazes and smiles (primary intersubjectivity), to the sharing of attention toward objects, including the 
actual offering and request for physical things (secondary intersubjectivity), and ultimately to the 
negotiation of material and immaterial values in reciprocal interpersonal exchanges (tertiary 
intersubjectivity, see Rochat & Passos-Ferreira 2008 for further discussion), but also, and more 
importantly in relation to the present topic, the novel expression of group affiliation and group conformity 
that brings the experience of being part of a we to a new, much larger level.  
 
5.1. Primary intersubjectivity: Affective sharing (2-months and up) 
By approximately 6 weeks post partum, a new kind of mutuality emerges that is distinct from the 
primeval biological and instinctive co-regulation we find already at birth. It is from this time onwards 
that infants engage in face-to-face interaction, and display the first socially elicited smiling. It is this first 
active sharing of affects in proto-conversation with others that amounts to the so-called primary 
intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1980). It is the original ground for sharing in the literal sense of reciprocal 
exchanges. Infancy researchers have documented and characterized this sharing in terms of rhythmical 
turn taking (Gergely and Watson 1999), and two way shared mutual gaze (Stern 1985, Stern et al. 1985). 
It goes beyond mere affective mirroring or emotional contagion as such exchanges take place for the first 
time within open-ended, co-created transactions made of successive emotional bids. To share an 
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experience with someone else is not to have an experience of one’s own and then simply to add 
knowledge about the other’s perspective on top; rather a shared experience is a qualitatively new kind of 
experience, one that is quite unlike any experience one could have on one’s own. The other’s presence 
and reciprocation makes all the difference. 
Infants at birth open their eyes and orient their gazes toward faces, preferring face to non face 
objects. Even though they are documented to imitate facial gestures and emotional expression (like 
tongue protrusion or sad faces) (Meltzoff and Moore 1977; Field 1982), the gaze of newborns remains 
often sluggish and hard to capture, as if it is passing through you. Starring straight at a newborn with 
open eyes often gives the impression that the child is looking through you rather than at you. By 6-8 
weeks, however, the gaze becomes unmistakably shared and mutual, inaugurating a proto-conversational 
space of genuinely open-ended social exchanges made of turn taking and a novel sensitivity. Mothers 
commonly report that they now discover a person in their baby. Whereas eye-to-eye contacts are often 
threatening signs and tend to be avoided in other primate species, it is a major attractor in humans and 
becomes a critical index of engagement in proto-conversational and early inter-subjective exchanges. It 
is a variable picked up by the child as a measure of the relative degree to which others are socially 
engaged and attentive, affectively attuned and effectively ‘with’ them. It gives rise to prototypical 
narrative envelops co-constructed in interaction with others, made for example of tension build-ups and 
sudden releases of tension, like in peek-a-boo games that are universally compelling to infants starting 
the second month (Stern 1985, Rochat 2001). Such exchanges are primarily scaffold by strong affective 
marking and compulsive affective amplification on the part of the caretaker producing high pitch 
inflections of voice and exaggerated facial expressions (‘motherese’), tapping into the child’s attentional 
capacities and perceptual preferences (Gergely & Watson 1999; Stern et al. 1985; Rochat 1999, 2001). 
The adult’s systematic tendency toward affective scaffolding and amplification, a running emotional 
commentary that is attuned to the child’s expressed emotions, combined with the novel attentional 
capacities of the child by the second month (Wolff 1987) makes such proto-conversation more than mere 
complementary actions between adult and child. Play and sharing games give children privileged access 
to their own limits and possibilities as agents in their environment. It is in such affective, face-to-face 
playful exchanges of gazes and smiles that infants first gauge their social situation: the impact they have 
on others, the quality of social attention they are able to generate and receive from others. It is from this 
point on that we can talk of sharing as a process that rests on reciprocation and putative co-creation of 
affects in interactions with others. Importantly, in relation to our topic, this is a process in which for the 
first time self and other are engaged together in an open-ended, emotional bid building process. This 
emergence defines a novel horizon for development that leads the child toward symbolic functioning, 
explicit self-consciousness as opposed to implicit self-awareness, linguistic competence, and ultimately 
the development of an ethical stance toward others (i.e., strong reciprocity in sharing, see Robbins & 
Rochat 2011). It also provides a basis for infants to become socially selective and sensitive to social 
identity markers like language, manifesting already from approximately 3 months relative preference and 
affiliation with particular others that are more familiar. For example, recent research show that by 6 
months, infants prefer strangers who speak with no foreign accent (Kinzler et al. 2007); respond to them 
in a familiar temporal manner (Bigelow & Rochat 2006); or act in pro-social as opposed to anti-social 
ways (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom 2007). 
 
5.2. Secondary intersubjectivity: Referential sharing (7-9 months and up) 
If by 2 months infants begin to share experience in face-to-face, open-ended proto-conversation with 
others, things change again by 7-9 months when infants break away from mere face-to-face reciprocal 
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exchanges to engage in referential sharing with others about things in the world outside of the dyadic 
exchange. This transition is behaviorally indexed with the emergence of social referencing and triadic 
joint attention whereby a triangular reciprocal exchange emerge between child and others in reference to 
objects or events in the environment (Striano & Rochat 2000; Tomasello 1995). By triangulation of 
attention, objects become jointly captured and shared. Objects start feeding into the exchange. This is the 
sign of a ‘secondary’ inter-subjectivity (Trevarthen 1980) adding to the first exchanges of 2-6 month-
olds.  
Prototypical instances of triadic joint attention include not only cases where the child is passively 
attending to the other, but also cases where the infant, through acts of protodeclarative pointing, actively 
invites another to share its focus of attention. In either case, the infant will often look back and forth 
between adult and object and use the feedback from his or her face to check whether joint attention has 
been realized. Importantly, the jointness of the attention is not primarily manifest in the mere gaze 
alternation, but in the shared affect that, for instance, is expressed in knowing smiles. One proposal has 
been that interpersonally coordinated affective states may play a pivotal developmental role in 
establishing jointness (Hobson & Hobson 2011, 116). Another suggestion has been to see joint attention 
as a form of communicative interaction. On this proposal, it is communication, which for instance can 
take the form of a meaningful look (i.e., it does not have to be verbal), that turns mutually experienced 
events into something truly joint (Carpenter & Liebal 2011, 168). 
This new triangulation emerging by 7-9 months is also, and maybe more importantly, about social 
affiliation and togetherness. Like the optical parallax that gives depth cues to viewers, first signs of joint 
attention gives children a new measure of their social affiliation, a novel social depth. By starting to point 
to objects in the presence of others, by presenting or offering grasped objects to social partners, infants 
prey for others’ mental focus by creating and advertising for a shared attention. Psychologically, it also 
corresponds to the first appropriation of an object as topic of social exchange, in the same way that in 
the course of a conversation someone might spontaneously appropriate an object (pen, stick of wood, 
any small object) to help in the telling of a story. The object, used as a conversational prop in early bouts 
of joint attention, becomes the infants’ new ‘fishing hook’ to capture, gauge and eventually possess others’ 
attention against which they can gauge further their relative agentive role, control, and impact in relation 
to others: their situation and place in the social environment.  
It is reasonable to state that in joint attention we find the roots of the child’s first socially shared 
mental projection of control over an object (i.e., possession in the literal sense). In starting to bring other 
people’s attention onto things in the environment, the infant opens up the possibility of claiming 
ownership of both the initiation of a conversation about something and the thing itself. Pointing, offering, 
or presenting objects to others, are all new social gestures becoming prominent in the healthy child from 
7-9 months.  
An object that is presented or offered can now be retrieved or taken away by others, given back 
or ignored by them. It gives rise to all sorts of new, complex and objectified social transactions. It is in 
these new objectified social transactions that the child consolidates the concept and idea of what 
eventually will become in a few months developmental time and with the emergence of language the 
explicit claim of ownership: the assertion of “that’s mine!” and “not yours!”; an explicit assertion of 
ownership that on its part allows for new forms of sharing. 
From this point on, and at this pre-linguistic stage of development, objectified and socially shared 
centrifugal and centripetal forces are the new playing field created by children (Tomasello et al. 2005, 
Rochat & Striano 1999). It is a crucial step in the development of sharing. Feeding their basic affiliation 
need, children learn from then on that with objects, others’ attention and recognition can be earned and 
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shared. Note that what develops are new forms and objects of reciprocation all presupposing the same 
basic self-other differentiation and empathic stance that appear to be expressed and maintained from the 
outset. 
 By 11-12 months, the child adds a novel layer of meaning to referential sharing. This layer 
corresponds to a novel understanding of the manners in which sharing and exchange games are played. 
They begin to modulate their ways of sharing and reciprocating, becoming more selective of the person 
they share with, trying to imitate or to coordinate actions in attempts of co-operation. 
From 12 months of age, infants also begin to show significantly greater modulation and flexibility 
by engaging spontaneously in role reversal imitation (Ratner & Bruner 1978). For example, imagine a 
situation where an adult engages the infant to play a collaborative game where the adult holds a basket 
and the infant throws toys into it. If the adult suddenly stops holding the basket and now wants to throw, 
12 month-olds seeing this are able to switch roles to continue the joint game: the infant will spontaneously 
stop throwing, grab and hold the basket to let the adult throw the toys (Carpenter et al. 2005).  
Typical development of social experience leads children toward an inclination to identify with 
others. Indeed, Hobson argues that in affective sharing the process of ‘identifying-with’ plays a very 
early and pivotal role in typical social development by structuring “social experience with polarities of 
self-other differentiation as well as connectedness” (Hobson 2008, 386). From 12 months, infants can 
follow through and maintain the sharing, collaborative game by taking the role of the other, that is, the 
child begins to show some rudiments of perspective taking and the budding ability to get into the shoes 
of others. 
The investigation of joint attention suggests that we to a large extent come to understand others 
by sharing objects and events with them. Moll and Tomasello have argued that by the second year infants 
in situations of joint engagements where they are directly being addressed by the adult and involved in 
her actions are able to learn things and display skills they otherwise could not (Moll, Carpenter & 
Tomasello 2007). Indeed, it has been suggested that infants come to learn about the social world, not 
“from ‘he’s’ or ‘she’s’ whom they observe dispassionately from the outside” but “from ‘you’s’ with 
whom they interact and engage in collaborative activities with joint goals and shared attention” (Moll 
and Meltzoff 2011, 398). By 14 months, the infant becomes explicit in discriminating the shared 
experience of an object as special. They are able to discriminate objects experienced by ‘we’ as opposed 
to ‘I’ alone (Tomasello et al., 2005, Moll et al., 2008). 
   
5.3. Tertiary intersubjectivity:  co-consciousness and group identification (21 months and up) 
The expletive “Mine!” that children utter from around the same age (approximately 21 months, Bates 
1990,Tomasello 1998) is symptomatic of a major transition happening at this stage. The explicit assertion 
of ownership parallels the emergence of explicit self-recognition and self-objectification in the mirror 
(Rochat and Zahavi 2011), but also novel expressions of self-conscious emotions like blushing, shame, 
envy, or pride. The awareness of being evaluated by others starts to shape toddlers’ social and affective 
lives. It is from this point on that children show first signs of systematic self-management, starting to 
care about their own reputation in relation to others as both individuals and groups of individuals (Rochat 
2013). Related to self-management and audience awareness, it is also from then on that children develop 
a renewed ability to conceal their mental states, manipulating what they expose of themselves to others. 
As part of this major developmental step, children become particularly sensitive to approbations or dis-
approbations from others, constantly gauging and promoting their own social affiliation. They probe and 
see what works and what doesn’t in sharing with others, starting a new era of bartering and endless 
negotiation of permissions that parents of 2 and 3 year-olds know too well. They properly start to have 
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others in mind in the sharing process, while never confounding their own perspective with that of others. 
This transition toward tertiary inter-subjectivity is briefly illustrated below with empirical findings on (a) 
the development of an ethical stance taken by children toward others between 3 and 5 years, and (b) the 
parallel emergence of a sensitivity to group norms and affiliation, including explicit ostracism from 6-7 
years and beyond. 
(a) When asked to split a small collection of valuable tokens with another, 3 year-olds tend to 
self-maximize in their distribution, becoming significantly more equitable by 5 years of age. This 
developmental phenomenon is robust and has been documented across at least 7 highly contrasted 
cultures (Rochat et al. 2009). Between 3 and 5 years, children start to act ‘principally’ toward others, 
according to some ethical principles of fairness they internalize and seemingly hold for themselves. They 
become sensitive to the moral and ethical dimension of sharing possession with others and try to reach 
‘just’ decisions. More generally speaking, children typically develop as autonomous moral agents as 
opposed to strict conformists who simply obey and abide the greatest, more powerful majority in order 
to feed a basic social affiliation need. From this point on, they start to show signs that they care about 
their moral identity. They begin to show clear signs that they try to maintain self-unity and coherence, 
avoiding moral self-dissonance in relation to others, including groups.  
(b) Parallel to the development of principled sharing, children also become progressively more 
sensitive to what people think of them. Sharing is the primary context in which children establish their 
own moral perspective and moral identity in the evaluative eyes of others. Beyond 6 years of age, further 
layers are added, where children increasingly refer and abide to trade rules and the pragmatics of what 
become ritualized exchanges sanctioned by institutions (group norms, collective ways of being, school 
or playground culture). They become progressively more sensitive and aware of the cultural context: the 
institutional or consensual collective order that transcends and ultimately governs personal wants and 
inclinations (Rochat 2014). If the referential sharing occurring at the preceding level (secondary inter-
subjectivity, see above) would correspond to a dyadic we-experience with a particular individual in the 
context of here and now small-scale collaboration expressed in either social referencing or joint attention, 
the co-conscious sharing occurring at the tertiary level of intersubjectivity is qualitatively and structurally 
different. It amounts to a group-based we-experience in the context of larger scale collaboration. This 
would correspond to the predictable developmental transition between two forms of shared intentionality, 
what Tomasello has recently called joint intentionality and collective intentionality respectively 
(Tomasello 2014).  
As children start manifesting an ethical stance between the age of 3 and 5, they also start to expand 
their experience of being part of a larger we by becoming sensitive to group affiliation and its necessary 
counterpart: the potential of being socially excluded. Entering institutions that extend the family 
environment to peers (i.e, pre-schools and other kindergarten), children develop a new sense of group 
belongingness. They start to identify with the group, they show in-group biases and start to endorse group 
attitudes. They come to share the view and preferences of the group. Classic instances of strong group 
conformity (Ash 1956) are replicated in 3-4 year-old children who tend to reverse their own objective 
perceptual judgments to fit a peer group majority opinion (Corriveau & Harris 2010; Corriveau, Kim, 
Song & Harris 2013; Haun & Tomasello 2011; Haun, van Leeuwen & Edelso 2013). From 5 years and 
beyond, sharing drastically expand and begin to map the social psychology of individuals in their relation 
to the group, in particular the in-group/out-group dynamic described in adult social psychology 
experiments. Multiple experiments show that children are quick to affiliate with particular groups based 
on minimal criteria (blue team vs. red team). By 4 years, they are prompt to manifest out-group gender 
or racial stereotypes and other implicit group attitude biases toward others (Cvencek, Greenwald, & 
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Meltzoff 2011). From approximately 7 years, children also begin to manifest active ostracism and social 
rejection in order to affirm one’s own group affiliation and identity (Aboud 1988; Nesdale 2008). 
From the time children become aware of and start to internalize the other’s evaluative attitude 
towards themselves, the content of what they identify as their own characteristics (who they are as 
persons in the larger social context) become increasingly determined by how they compare to the 
perceived and represented (belief) characteristics of others as individuals but also as particular group of 
individuals (e.g., siblings vs. peers, parents vs. strangers). This is evidenced by the inseparable 
development of self-conceptualizing and the early formation of gender identity and social prejudice, the 
way children construe their relative affiliation and manifest affinities to particular groups by ways of 
self-inclusion and identification, as well as by social exclusion: the counterpart of any social 
identification, affiliation, or group alliance (Dunn 1988; Nesdale et al. 2005). 
Extending the original cognitive-developmental work of Kohlberg (1966) on sex-role concepts 
and attitudes, research shows that by the middle of the third year (i.e., 31 months), children correctly 
identify their own gender (Weintraub et al. 1984). Interestingly, the degree of gender identity expressed 
by 3-year-olds depends on parental characteristics. Weintraub and colleagues found that, compared to 
other parents, fathers who have more conservative attitudes toward women, who tend to engage less in 
activities that are stereotyped as feminine, and who score low on various femininity scores have children 
scoring higher on the gender identity task. These findings demonstrate the early onset of group identity 
(i.e., gender) and the role of social influences in the determination of early group categorization and 
identification. In relation to social prejudice, research investigating children’s social identity 
development suggests that, contrary to gender, it is only by age 4 to 5 years that children are aware of 
their own ethnic and racial identity. Only then do they begin to show identification with and preference 
for their own ethnic group (see Gibson-Wallace, Robbins, & Rochat 2015/in press). 
Early on, children derive self-esteem, and hence a conception of self-worth, from group 
membership and group status. According to Nesdale (2004), for example, ethnic and racial preference 
manifested by 5-year-olds is based on a drive to assert their own in-group affiliation, and not yet focusing 
on the characteristics of out-group members that they would eventually discriminate or exclude. Social 
prejudices, whereby some children might find self-assertiveness in focusing on negative aspects of out-
group members, are manifested in development no earlier than 7 to 8 years of age based on Nesdale’s 
research and interpretation. 
From 7 years on, the self and social identity begin to be conceptualized on the basis of combined 
social affiliation and exclusion processes. These combined processes are contrasting or ‘bringing out’ 
the self positively by association with some persons and negatively by dissociation with other. From then 
on, children are subject to group norm influences. They begin to construe their social identity through 
the looking glass of the group they affiliate with, as well as the members of other groups they exclude. 
In this dual complementary process, combining affiliation and contrast or opposition to selected others, 
children manifest new ways of asserting and specifying who they are as persons, for themselves as well 
as for others as individuals and groups of individuals.  
In summary, developmental observations force us to recognize complex varieties of sharing that 
can be organized in relation to 3 major categories following the necessary chronology of their emergence 
in ontogeny. All of these varieties require from the outset self-other(s) differentiation rather than some 
kind of fusion. Indeed, developmental research suggests that it is primarily through the dynamic process 
of value negotiation between differentiated self and other(s) that something like we-ness or we-
experience may arise. 
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6. Conclusion  
Let us, in closing, briefly return to the issue of empathy. Our initial target of criticism was the widespread 
view that empathy is a process whereby one individual comes to share another individual’s affective 
experience. We argued that sharing cannot simply be equated with similarity and that, while empathy 
can be one-sided, affective sharing is necessarily reciprocal. After having highlighted some findings from 
the early phenomenological exploration of empathy that supported this analysis, we then moved into the 
domain of psychology and carefully delineated three main developmental levels of sharing, leading from 
the exchange of gazes and smiles, through the sharing of attention towards objects and the offer and 
request for physical things, to what might be called group-based sharing.  
 Although our negative conclusion is that empathy does not involve or amount to affective sharing, 
this does not imply that the former is irrelevant for the latter. In fact, given the minimalist definition of 
empathy provided by the phenomenologists, where empathy rather than being identified with, say, 
prosocial behavior or a very special kind of imaginative perspective taking, is simply used as a label for 
our most basic other-acquaintance, i.e., our sensitivity to and direct experience of other minded creatures, 
it should be fairly obvious that empathy is presupposed by all the early dyadic and triadic types of sharing 
that we have discussed in the previous section. On our account, informed by insights found in 
phenomenology and developmental psychology, empathy with its entailed preservation of the self-other 
differentiation must precisely be considered a central precondition for experiential sharing and 
emergence of a we (cf. Zahavi 2014b, 2015, León & Zahavi 2015).  
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